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Abstract
Timothy H. Dixon. 2017. Curbing Catastrophe: Natural Hazards and Risk Reduction in the Modern World.
(New York, NY: Cambridge University Press) 300 pp. ISBN 978-1108113663.

Curbing Catastrophe for the most part lives up to what is claimed in the foreword: “…a compelling
account of recent and historical disasters, both natural and human-caused, drawing on common themes
and providing a holistic understanding of hazards, disasters, and mitigation for anyone interested in this
important and topical subject.” This is a pretty thorough treatment of an extraordinarily complex subject,
and the gaps identified in this review should be considered explications more than criticisms.
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Makansi: Forewarned is Forearmed: Review of Curbing Catastrophe (Timothy H. Dixon, 2017)

I could spend a week writing about Curbing Catastrophe. Reading it was like
imagining a video retrospective of my career at my retirement dinner. I am a
chemical engineer by education and degree, with a career that evolved into what
I’ve often described as communicating about complex engineered systems,
concepts, and technologies to people who, for all practical purposes, have no earthly
ability to comprehend what I am telling them. This includes such varied situations
as explaining all sides of environmental issues to 8th graders, convincing venture
capitalists to invest in my client’s tech-venture startup, and urging elected officials
(and more importantly their staff) to champion legislation that could transform the
electricity industry through the adoption of new technology and more supportive
regulatory frameworks.
Every author surely hopes they convince at least one person to change as a
result of what they’ve put to paper. So I’ll start with this: Professor Dixon has
convinced me to forego permanently my weekly six-inch tuna fish sandwich at
Subway. I mean, I’ve known peripherally about the dangers of mercury
accumulation in predator fish (such as tuna) at the top of the oceanic food chain.
But the idea that they “can have mercury concentrations in their flesh that are
millions of times higher than ambient seawater…” will cause me to choose chicken
salad instead….Oh, but wait. Then I’ll be supporting the poultry industry and their
horrendous treatment of living species that are the raw material for the sandwich
factory that is Subway.
Beyond my attempt at humor, this conundrum gets to the heart of what
Professor Dixon covers: relative risk. A chain smoker may understand that the CO2
belched out of the power plant down the road is less of a risk to his health than lung
cancer, but that doesn’t mean he will quit smoking OR forego meetings of the local
environmental chapter trying to shut that plant down.
Relative risk is at the heart of how society determines where to put its
resources. While scientists and engineers have quantitative methods to estimate
relative risk using statistics, we also need to acknowledge, as Dixon so aptly does,
that most of the people who are ultimately going to make those decisions don’t have
a hope in hell of understanding those statistics and therefore will decide based on
gut reaction, historical precedent, personal experience, testimony from experts they
“trust,” and emotional factors.1
One of my earliest projects as a practicing engineer was to analyze the
saltwater cooling network for an aging, major petroleum refinery on the east coast.
The facility experienced a near-catastrophic loss of cooling one summer five years
prior. That incident led to an edict from the top brass: we shall not experience this
again!
1

Editor’s footnote: Readers interested in a discussion of the psychology of why people tend to
forego rigorous analysis of uncertainty might consider consulting the two reviews of Kahneman’s
Thinking Fast and Slow found in Numeracy, Vol. 10, Issue 2.
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Suffice it to say that the relative risk of a loss of coolant was negligible before
that fateful day, but such a loss was quickly elevated to a dire threat in the days and
years after. Memory, whether personal or institutional, plays a strong role in how
relative risks are perceived. Statistical analysis will always have difficulty
confronting that aspect of the human condition.
The other primary theme of Curbing Catastrophe is communication. Dixon
states, as many others have in books sitting on my shelves, that scientists are not
good at communicating to non-scientists and non-scientists are not receptive to the
scientific information, nor are people typically trained to digest such information. I
give the author much credit for hitting this theme early and often. It’s even more
critical in this “post-fact” phase [I hope it’s just a phase anyway] America seems to
be living in. He hits the hot buttons like increasing STEM-based education; pushing
for greater transparency; clearer writing to audiences other than peers; proliferation
of media outlets, which seem great at amplifying and propagating bad information
so that it crowds out the good, formal “lessons learned” activities; greater use of
independent boards; and many others.
Dixon misses one key issue, though. Sadly, most of what passes for objective
communication in our society is anything but. I can’t tell you how many
professional meetings I attend every year where it is clear that the presentations
aren’t designed to communicate to me, but instead to show me how much smarter
the presenter is than his or her audience, to explain why I should buy or fund what
the presenter is selling, to deliver support for an ideological position, or to cover
the company’s figurative ass when something bad has happened.
Rare is the Richard Feynman who in front of the television cameras drops a
rubber O-ring into an ice bath to unequivocally demonstrate why Challenger
exploded shortly after takeoff. More typically, we get the NASA scientists
struggling to protect their institution through obfuscation.
Truth is the first casualty of war, so the slogan goes, but it also tends to
dissipate quickly when catastrophe strikes. Fortunately, you’ll learn a great deal of
“truth” about an impressive list of catastrophic events Dixon elaborates on to
illustrate his points and arrive at his recommendations. Among them:










The Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire of 1911
Various earthquakes in modern times
The Tsunami that destroyed Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant
The Hindenburg explosion
The toxic legacy of lead
Mercury in the environment
The Galveston hurricane of 1900
Global warming
San Francisco’s 1906 earthquake.
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At first, I was wondering why Fukushima takes up so much of the “oxygen” in
this book. Then I got it. Fukushima is an especially poignant example because it
involves a natural disaster which precipitated a man-made catastrophe. There’s
much to learn from here. I hope professionals in my industry, electric power, find
their way to this book for this section alone.
One of the most useful chapters in Curbing Catastrophe is the summary at the
end, “recommendations by chapter.” I wish this section was placed at the beginning.
Managing risk, like safety, is a process of continuous education, refreshers,
adjustment, and improvement. Professor Dixon’s recommendations are excellent
reminders for professionals in all walks of life and career.
One glaring omission is curbing catastrophes induced by cyber security issues.
This problem appears to be the seminal challenge of the coming decades as complex
infrastructure like power stations operate with more and more automation and
remote diagnostics and fewer and fewer people on site. The concept of relative risk
rears its ugly head here as well with respect to trade-offs regarding resources,
economics, etc.
I think the author achieves what is claimed in the foreword: “…a compelling
account of recent and historical disasters, both natural and human-caused, drawing
on common themes and providing a holistic understanding of hazards, disasters,
and mitigation for anyone interested in this important and topical subject.” Given
that Professor Dixon is a geosciences expert, it is perhaps not surprising that his
analyses of natural disasters come across to this reviewer as a bit stronger than of
man-made ones.
In some areas, the narrative is uneven. For example, Chapter 2 begins by
describing recent and historical disasters, but then kind of veers off into a lengthy
treatise on how earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and other natural catastrophes
occur. This is excellent supporting information but I think better organized as an
appendix to keep the main themes moving along. On page 63, a reference to the
music industry appears somewhat out of nowhere as an example of the economist
Joseph Schumpeter’s concept of “creative destruction.”
There are a few areas where I think the author is on thinner ice, so to speak. I
was surprised that a geoscience expert would express support for long-term carbon
capture and storage (CCS) for coal-fired power plants. Now, the author does
disclose that he has received funding from the Department of Energy to investigate
aspects of CCS (keeping true to his transparency edict), but I’ve been evaluating
CCS against other options for two decades. Unless you’ve got no choice but to keep
burning coal, it’s a dubious alternative, at best a stopgap lifeline to allow existing
coal plants to keep running. But talk about a future catastrophe when that
underground storage dome is breached – accidentally (earthquake?) or deliberately
(terrorist event?) - releasing all that CO2 back into the environment and displacing
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oxygen for those living nearby. The challenge with a CCS site is it has to be
managed forever.
Dixon also refers to the magic of markets as a solution to manage catastrophe.
First of all, markets are magical (e.g., spurring quick innovation) only at the very
beginning of a new product or technology cycle, such as the personal computer in
the late 1970s and 1980s, cell phones in the 1990s, or automobiles and electricity
service in the first decades of the last century. They quickly become constructed
and conscripted to favor large players, keep newcomers out, and eventually
consolidate into a handful of oligopolies. I don’t want to dwell on this because I’m
not an economist, but neither is Dixon.
Finally, I’ll add a bit of insight to two graphs Dixon has on pages 8 and 9 (and
some evidence for my statement regarding markets above), which show the rise in
frequency and cost of weather-related disasters in the US. The graphs begin at 1980.
It’s a fascinating demarcation because that’s around when deregulation (allowing
“markets” to work their magic, according to advocates) got going in earnest in the
US and energy prices were peaking in the US. That’s also when the nuclear power
industry began its long slide to what now appears to be oblivion. Of course, I’m not
going to claim a correlation or even an association – it’s all too ambiguous for that
– but it is an interesting thing to think about.
If the US and the world had proceeded along the trends evident in 1980, we’d
likely be at 50% nuclear power for electricity production, displacing that amount
of coal and CO2, at least in “Western” economies. Further, if prevailing energy
prices of the time had remained high, consumers would have been forced to cut
consumption or industry would have been driven to develop non-fossil alternatives
far more quickly.
One thing markets and dominant market players don’t care much about is
future catastrophes, as long as the costs stay off of their profit and loss statements.
Dixon rightfully points out that such “externalities” are a major culprit in seeding
catastrophic events but does less to point out that protected markets, through
dominance, lobbying, standards development, etc. ensure that this behavior
continues. I’m not criticizing Dixon’s approach so much as reinforcing the
complexity of the issues he confronts.
Quite obviously, Dixon’s book has animated me in a good way to think through
some of these issues. I think the same will happen for other readers with similar
backgrounds. But I really hope those without four decades of experience with these
issues will be the ones to pick up Curbing Catastrophe and read it carefully. You
can’t ever know enough about how to plan ahead and avoid future catastrophic
events.
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